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Recent Developments Regarding Maritime Contribution
and Indemnity
Gus A. Schill, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Examining problems of maritime indemnity and contribution in the
context of personal injury and wrongful death litigation leads to the
general conclusion that any definition of these rights usually centers
upon the classification of the injured worker in conjunction with the
fortuitous location of the tort. The lack of a coherent approach to
maritime personal injury litigation, arising from differences in the law
applicable to the tort, adversely affects a reasoned determination of the
defendant's rights in seeking contribution or indemnity from another
party. In evaluating a defendant's options against other parties having
roles in the casualty, a controlling factor is usually whether the plaintiff's
rights arise pursuant to the general maritime law of the United States,
the Jones Act,' the Longshore & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act 2
(henceforth referred to as the Longshore Act), the statutes and decisions
of an adjoining state, and the worker's compensation act of the state
in whose waters the accident occurs. There is no logical method for
solving the problem of indemnity and contribution because the applicable
statutes often lack uniformity. Also, court decisions from various areas
of the country sometimes conflict. One consequence of this lack of
uniformity is the absence of predictable results for both maritime workers
and employers in the area of general maritime litigation. Another result
is the lack of clear guidelines for trial courts to use in deciding legal
questions and for attorneys to use in drafting maritime contracts.
The area for consideration is broader than personal injury litigation
since claims also result from damage to cargo or other property. The
vessel owner, when faced with the prospect of being cast in liability,
often seeks to recover indemnity or contribution from another party.,
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1. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. III 1985).
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3. See generally Note, Contractual Indemnity Under Maritime and Louisiana Law,
43 La. L. Rev. 189 (1982); Gorman, Indemnity and Contribution Under Maritime Law,
55 Tul. L. Rev. 1165 (1981).
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II. THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
Contemporary maritime concepts of indemnity and contribution have
two principal points for initial reference: Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic Steamship Corp.,4 and United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.5
Ryan represents an all or nothing recovery for the party seeking in-
demnity, 6 while Reliable Transfer determines recovery on the basis of
proportionate fault. 7 The conflicting philosophies underlying these two
concepts did not become a major problem until the courts began to
factor into the equation the 1972 Amendments of the Longshore Act.
The tripartite litigation between longshoremen, vessel owners, and
stevedores/employers significantly affected the dockets of the federal
courts. a This element, along with the low proportionate recovery on the
part of the plaintiff as compared with the total costs of litigation, led
Congress to consider an improved method for increasing the injured
party's -share of the total dollar recovery.9 The amendments to the
Longshore Act were designed to accomplish this result. The compensation
benefits were increased, and the instances in which an injured long-
shoreman could seek recovery from a vessel owner were significantly
reduced by removing the vessel's warranty of seaworthiness as a predicate
for liability and replacing this liability feature with a newly designed
concept of maritime negligence. At the same time, the vessel's owner
was denied any express or implied contractual indemnity rights against
4. 350 U.S. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232 (1956).
5. 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975). Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke,
Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 112-13, 94 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (1974) extended the proportionate fault
concept of Reliable Transfer to non-collision maritime matters, a point which was not
free from doubt due to Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282, 72 S. Ct. 277 (1952).
6. The defense available to the stevedore or other independent contractors is that
the vessel owner's conduct was sufficient to preclude indemnity. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co.
v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 567, 78 S. Ct. 438, 441 (1958), speaks of this
defense as precluding any recovery as opposed to an adjustment based on proportionate
fault. Further, under the Ryan theory, attorney's fees and other costs of defense incurred
by the indemnitee can be recovered from the indemnitor. Todd Shipyards v. Turbine
Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 401, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036, 103 S. Ct. 447
(1982), and Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 362 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1004, 87 S. Ct. 708 (1967). This conclusion is contrary to
the general maritime law principle which denies cost of defense as a recoverable item.
Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 1980).
7. One of the first decisions to utilize this theory in the area of personal injury
litigation between tortfeasors is Cooper Stevedoring v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106,
94 S. Ct. 2174 (1974).
8. H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 4698, 4703 [hereinafter H.R. Rep. 14411.
9. Id. at 4702.
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the stevedore/employer.' 0 The result of the statutory prohibition was
that the vessel owner could make no recovery from the injured long-
shoreman's employer based upon either the Ryan implied contractual
duty, an express contractual undertaking, or contribution predicated upon
tort concepts."
One question presented by the legislation concerns the continued
vitality of the Ryan doctrine in situations which do not involve an
injured longshoreman as a plaintiff. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the
Ryan theory of recovery, which was based upon a maritime contractor's
breach of a duty owed the vessel owner to perform the work in a
reasonably safe and workmanlike manner, had been extended to situa-
tions involving cargo damage, 2 a dredge repair contract, 3 and a drill
pipe testing operation.' 4 A second inquiry is whether a non-vessel owner
under the present wording of the Longshore Act can seek indemnity
predicated upon a contractual theory from the stevedore/employer, since
the statutory indemnity prohibition clause is limited to direct or indirect
actions of the vessel." This article reviews the present avenues which
are available, in a maritime context, to a defendant seeking recovery
for contribution or indemnity from another party.
III. AVAILABLE REMEDIES AND DEFENSES IN MARITIME ACTIONS FOR
INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION
A. Litigation Dealing With the Longshore Act
It would appear from the language of the amendments to the Long-
shore Act that the stevedore/employer is insulated from contractual
indemnity or contribution claims based on tort by the defendant in
situations in which the injured longshoreman has instituted litigation
10. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1982). This has been described as the quid pro quo giving
up by the vessel of its indemnity rights against the stevedore in exchange for the elimination
of a longshoreman's cause of action predicated upon the vessel's unseaworthiness. Samuels
v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
443 U.S. 915, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1979); Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 721 (2d
Cir. 1978).
11. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753
(1979).
12. F.J. Walker, Ltd. v. M/V Lemoncore, 561 F.2d 1138, 1148 (5th Cir. 1977);
Walter J. Garic, Inc. v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel Navigation Dist., 1968
A.M.C. 2701 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
13. Parfait v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 484 F.2d 296, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub nom., E. Ruppel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., and Home Indemnity Co. v. E. Ruppel,
415 U.S. 957, 94 S. Ct. 1485 (1974).
14. Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Co., 446 F.2d 394, 399-401 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1982).
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against a third party; however, this conclusion is subject to an exception.
The statutory language from section 905 is:
(a) The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of
this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer ... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account
of such injury or death ....
(b) [A]nd the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void. 16
Subsection (a) has been held to preclude actions by any party against
the employer for tort-based indemnity or contribution, but does not
affect an action for indemnity based upon a contractual relationship. 17
The issue is the scope of subsection (b) as a factor negating the em-
ployer's liability for contractual indemnity, either directly or indirectly,
to a party that can be categorized as a "non-vessel." This question is
discussed and consideration given to a method sanctioned by the courts
to avoid indirectly the contractual prohibition of 905(b).
1. The Contractual Requirement of Being Named an Additional
Insured to the Maritime Contractor's Insurance Policy
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Voisin v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling
Co., 8 concluded that a contractual obligation on the part of the employer
to name the vessel owner as an additional insured in the insurance policy
can be enforced. Enforcement is allowed since this contractual duty is
not incompatible with the statutory language of 905(b) precluding any
agreement which would indirectly hold the employer liable for damages
paid by the vessel owner to the injured employee.19 It should follow
that a contract could also require the employer to provide for a waiver
of subrogation by its insurer in favor of the vessel owner. 0 Therefore,
16. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1982) (emphasis added). A time charterer comes within the
definition of vessel as used by the statute. Aucoin v. Pelham Marine, Inc., 593 F. Supp.
770, 772 (W.D. La. 1984); Tenneco, Inc. v. Loomis Int'l, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1987, no writ).
17. Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1986); Drake v. Raymark
Indus., 772 F.2d 1007, 1021 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1126, 106 S. Ct. 1994
(1986); Odom v. Monogram Indus., 555 F. Supp. 378, 379 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
18. 744 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053, 105 S. Ct. 1757
(1985).
19. In accord with Voisin is Stockstill v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 888 F.2d 1493, 1496
(5th Cir. 1989).
20. Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 616 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1980) is in accord
with Voisin and also discusses waiver of subrogation.
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the vessel owner can indirectly reach the same objective of essentially
holding the stevedore financially responsible through its insurer even
though the vessel owner is prevented by statute from doing the same
under either the Ryan doctrine or an express indemnity clause within
the stevedoring contract.
Allowing the vessel to recover from the stevedore's insurer arguably
circumvents the unequivocal language of the amendments; however, the
long range objective of reducing the cost of longshore litigation is
achieved by eliminating the insurance expense for at least one party.
The concept of one insurer covering the risks of several parties appears
to be cost effective and should be considered for other types of maritime
transactions. In the final analysis, the vessel owner unquestionably pays
for the stevedore's insurance program by way of charges associated with
the loading or the discharging of vessels; therefore, it is not unreasonable
for the vessel's interest to benefit from the stevedore's insurance program.
2. The Maritime Employer's Exposure for Indemnity Sought by
Parties Not Associated With Vessels
The next inquiry is whether the statute precludes a non-vessel owner
from seeking indemnity from a maritime employer pursuant to the Ryan
theory of an implied contractual duty or an express contractual agree-
ment. The decisions which have treated this question in the context of
post-1972 personal injuries allow indemnity actions by non-vessel owners
predicated upon an express or implied contractual duty, but have denied
contribution or indemnity pursuant to a tort theory. Pippen v. Shell
Oil Co. 21 states that section 905(b) expressly terminates an implied or
express indemnity duty only to a "vessel," but makes no specific ref-
erence to the right of a third party non-vessel to seek indemnity from
the injured party's employer on a contractual theory. The rationale is
that the prohibition expressed in section 905(b) was a quid pro quo
trade off in favor of the stevedore since the compensation rates were
substantially increased. In return, the longshoreman's action against the
vessel would be limited to a strict definition of negligence which would
not give the vessel a right for indemnity against the stevedore.2 These
concerns regarding the congressional compromise are not present when
a non-vessel owner seeks indemnity. Subsequent decisions are in harmony
with this aspect of the Pippen decision.23
21. 661 F.2d 378, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1981).
22. H.R. Rep. 1441, supra note 8, at 4701-05. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-71, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2759-62 (1979).
23. Avondale Shipyards v. Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1274 (5th Cir. 1986);
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B. Indemnity and Contribution Move Offshore
The application of maritime indemnity and contribution in the con-
text of offshore oil and gas activities is complex due to several incon-
sistent factors. In this geographical area, competing statutes-and
inconsistent policies prevent a reasoned review of the issues. The most
reliable measure for evaluating a client's rights relative to a claim for
indemnity or contribution depends upon the status of the injured party,
and/or whether the accident occurred on a fixed platform, a platform
which is capable of being floated from one drilling location to another,
or a conventional vessel.
In this regard, attention will be focused upon situations involving
injuries to seamen who come within the protective scope of the Jones
Act or general maritime law, offshore workers whose remedies are
provided by the Longshore Act, or injured parties who must bring their
actions pursuant to the compensation act of the adjoining state. A
subsidiary point for consideration is whether maritime law or the law
of the adjoining state controls the definition, scope, or enforceability
of an express agreement for indemnity.
The preceding problems are created in part by random assignment
of workers to offshore structures and the fortuitous circumstance of the
employee's location at the time of the accident. In most instances, these
factors can be determinative of the plaintiff's choice of recovery, i.e.,
whether the applicable choice is the Jones Act and/or the general mari-
time law's remedy for unseaworthiness,4 the Longshore Act, or the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).25 Under the OCSLA, the
substantive laws of the adjoining state determine the rights of the parties
when the injury occurs in United States waters on a fixed platform on
the outer continental shelf. The remedy usually available to the plaintiff
is adopted from the state whose borders, if extended, would encompass
the fixed platform. The exception is the issue of compensation benefits
to the injured worker from the employer, with the compensation act of
Tran v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 767 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1985); Zapico v. Bucyrus-
Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 721 (2d Cir. 1978); Couch v. Cro-Marine Trans., Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 978, 984 (C.D. Ill. 1989); Horton v. Sun Exploration and Prod. Co., 616 F. Supp.
130, 131 (W.D. La. 1985); Inland Oil & Trans. Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 624 F.
Supp. 122, 125 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Roderick v. Bugge, 584 F. Supp. 626, 633 (D. Mass.
1984); Gaudet v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 568 F. Supp. 795, 798 (E.D. La. 1983); and
Dockside Terminal Serv. v. Port Houston Marine, Inc., 658 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253, 104 S. Ct. 3537
(1984). Contra Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp. 798, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
24. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946), extended the
vessel's warranty of seaworthiness to workers who perform work traditionally carried out
by crewmembers.
25. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988).
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the adjoining state being applicable if the accident occurs in that state's
territorial waters and the Longshore Act governing injuries beyond state
waters.26 The Longshore Act provides for compensation benefits to non-
seaman workers injured on vessels which are situated on any of the
navigable waters of the outer continental shelf irrespective of location
within or without the territorial coverage of the adjoining state. This
statute is also available tO employees who are injured on fixed structures
which are not within the territorial waters of an adjoining state. It
should be remembered that a party's rights or defenses in an indemnity/
contribution controversy are usually controlled by the remedies which
are available to the plaintiff.
Bridges v. Penrod Drilling Co. 27 and Cooper v. Lopern demonstrate
a conflict on the question of whether the Ryan theory or proportionate
fault prevails relative to an action in a situation in which the plaintiff
is a seaman and claims the benefits of the Jones Act. It appears that
the Ryan indemnity theory would be applied if the seaman's action
against a vessel owner is predicated upon an unseaworthy condition
which was created by the actions of an independent contractor aboard
the vessel, whether it is a traditional watercraft, movable drilling plat-
form, or special purpose vessel. This was the pre-1972 rule,29 and there
can be no reason for a different result since the Longshore Act is not
involved. A recent decision from the United States District Court of
Maryland concluded that the vessel owner could obtain indemnification
on the Ryan theory for payments to the injured seaman for maintenance
and cure to its crewmembers due to the stevedore's failure to perform
its work in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner."
With the exception of the maritime contractor who is protected by
the Longshore Act and the tug/tow situations illustrated in Bisso v.
Inland Waterways Corp.," maritime principles permit the parties to enter
into an agreement whereby the indemnitor holds the indemnitee harmless
26. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 105 S. Ct. 1421 (1985), on remand, 766
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1985); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 101 S.
Ct. 2870 (1981).
27. 740 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1984).
28. 923 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1991).
29. Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Co., 446 F.2d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 1971).
30. Heyman v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., No. 88-02341 (D. Md. August
17, 1990). "
31. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90, 75 S. Ct. 629, 632 (1955),
held that exculpatory clauses in towage agreements involving the tug's negligence are
contrary to public policy; however, Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc. v. West India Carriers,
Inc., 492 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836, 95 S. Ct. 63 (1974),
supports the proposition that essentially the same result can be achieved by the tug
requiring the barge owner to have its insurer name the tug's interest as an additional
insured and to waive subrogation.
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for the latter's negligence. Maritime decisions are then utilized to de-
termine whether this obligation has been expressed with clarity. 2 A
decision from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 33 reviewed apparently
inconsistent conclusions set forth in Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp.34 and
Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors,3 and concluded that the governing
law is not that of the situs of either the tort or the contract's per-
formance, but rather depends upon whether the contract is maritime in
nature. The court found the master service contract to be maritime in
the circumstances of the worker's injury because the work in progress
specifically involved activities which were of a maritime nature. The
result was that a hold harmless agreement in the master service contract
was enforceable; however, a contrary result would have been reached
if the activities had not been maritime, and Louisiana law would have
then controlled the parties' rights.36 Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co. 3 7
recognized that "[f]rom these inconsistent lines of authority springs the
potential for significant uncertainty in the law applicable to offshore
mineral exploration," but a resolution of the inconsistencies was left to
"the court en banc.' '3s
It is suggested that, in the drafting of a hold harmless agreement,
the vessel or vessels which are covered should be named, and specific
reference should be made to the eventuality of indemnity being permitted
even if the indemnitee's negligence, in whole or in part, is the cause
of a future casualty. Furthermore, the eventuality of gross negligence,
32. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 1986), held that the
indemnitee could prevail if the accident resulted from its negligence under the following
contractual language: "Operator agrees to ... indemnify ... Contractor ... from all
claims ... without limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the negligence
of any party." Id. at 540. Seal Offshore, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 736 F.2d
1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1984), afrd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 777 F.2d 1042
(5th Cir. 1985), reviewed a hold harmless agreement which did not have sufficient language
to enforce the indemnitee's view that its negligence was included within the terms of the
hold harmless agreement. See also Goings v. Falcon Carriers, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1140
(E.D. Tex. 1989).
33. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990). See also
Domingue v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991), which
sets forth the maritime/non-maritime guidelines; and Thibodeaux v. Atlantic Pacific Marine
Corp., No. 88-0234 (W.D. La. August 17, 1989), where an appeal was filed and argued
before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; however, the litigation was settled
prior to a decision by the court.
34. 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 1986).
35. 836 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1988).
36. See Jones v. Berwick Bay Oil Co., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. La. 1988) and
Stiltner v. Exxon Corp., 593 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. La. 1983), which state that a hold harmless
clause in a non-maritime contract relative to offshore exploration work cannot be enforced
if Louisiana law is applicable.
37. 898 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1990).
38. Id. at 1088.
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punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs should be mentioned if they
are within the contemplation of the parties. It pays to be as specific
as possible in drafting such an agreement since this should prevent both
parties from litigating the meaning of the indemnity clause at a later
date.
There are additional complexities which pertain to personal injuries
for both maritime and non-maritime workers in the offshore area.
Consideration will be given to an injury which occurs aboard a "vessel"
(jack-up rig or conventional vessel), a fixed platform in state territorial
waters, and a fixed structure outside of state waters. A "seaman" has
the right to claim general damages pursuant to the Jones Act against
his employer and to make a claim of unseaworthiness against the vessel
owner. The non-seaman worker on a vessel located within or outside
state waters on the outer continental shelf is limited to an action against
the employer under the Longshore Act and could proceed against the
vessel owner on a theory of negligence.3 9 Actions for indemnity and
contribution should be governed by the concepts developed pursuant to
the Longshore Act. An accident which occurs on a fixed structure brings
about a situation in which the injured party's compensation remedy
against his employer is dependent upon whether the situs of the structure
is in state or federal territorial waters; however, the laws of the adjoining
state control the injured party's rights against a non-employer as well
as a party's remedy for indemnity or contribution irrespective of the
location of the fixed platform.40 The employer may not claim protection
from an action for contractual indemnity pursuant to section 905(b) of
the Longshore Act in the event the employee is injured in federal waters
since a "vessel" is not the indemnitee but rather the platform owner,
and any defense would be by reference to the law of the adjoining
state. Maritime law would not apply since the action involves a fixed
.structure.4 1
39. Mills v. Director, OWCP, United States Dep't of Labor, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.
1989); Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co., 867 F.2d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 1989), later proceeding
(E.D. LA. 1990) (Lexis, Genfed, U.S. Dist. file); Wentz v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 784 F.2d
699 (5th Cir. 1986). Workers on a fixed structure outside the territorial waters of a state
obtain compensation pursuant to the Longshore Act. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director,
OWCP, 812 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1987); Wentz v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 784 F.2d 699 (5th
Cir. 1986).
40. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1988); Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349 (1971); Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S. Ct. 1835 (1969).
41. Wooton v. Pumpkin Air, Inc., 869 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1989), holds that the law
of the adjoining state, and not that state's choice of law test, prevails. Laredo Offshore
Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985). The interesting point
is that, since a statute of the United States is involved in the litigation (the OCSLA), a
federal court has jurisdiction over a state question. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
1991]
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Both Texas and Louisiana have anti-indemnity oil field statutes which
prohibit oil lease holders from obtaining certain hold harmless obligations
on the part of the drilling contractor covering the indemnitee's negli-
gence. 42 Louisiana refuses to permit a hold harmless clause pertaining
to the indemnitee's negligence in a drilling contract. 4 Also, Louisiana
fails to recognize the indirect method of requiring the drilling contractor
to name the oil company as an additional insured in the policy," and
a choice of law provision within the contract cannot circumvent the
application of the statute.45 The Texas statute" permits a hold harmless
agreement to a maximum figure of $500,000 provided there is underlying
insurance coverage. 47 Mutual indemnity obligations are permitted in Texas
to the extent that the parties' underlying insurance coverage is in equal
amounts," but there are no Texas decisions which indicate that the anti-
indemnity statute cannot be circumvented by a contractual requirement
that the drilling contractor's insurance policy name the oil company as
an additional insured and/or waive subrogation. One conclusion which
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483 n.12, 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2878 n.12 (1981); Bailey v. Marlin
Drilling Co., No. G-83-105 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
42. State law cannot be a point of reference in the interpretation of a maritime
indemnity agreement. Angelina Casualty Co. v. Exxon Corp. U.S.A., 876 F.2d 40 (5th
Cir. 1989). The location of the accident in state territorial waters does not alter the
maritime definition to be given a hold harmless provision in a maritime contract; in other
words, the law of the adjoining state does not govern. Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co.,
898 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1990).
43. Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, La. R.S. 9:2780 (Supp. 1986); Doucet v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S. Ct. 272
(1986); Knapp v. Chevron U.S.A., 781 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1986); Carney v. Marathon
Oil Co., 632 F. Supp. 1037, 1047-49 (W.D. La. 1986). It should be noted that a contractual
indemnity agreement is proper with respect to the indemnitor's conduct. Rigby v. Tenneco
Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1247, 1248-49 (E.D. La. 1985).
44. Babineaux v. McBroom Rig Bldg. Serv., 806 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.), held in
abeyance, 811 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.), issuance of mandate ordered, 817 F.2d 1126 (1987).
An agreement requiring that the contractor's insurance policy name the indemnitee as an
additional insured at the indemnitee's expense is valid. Patterson v. Conoco, Inc., 670
F. Supp. 182 (W.D. La. 1987).
45. Matte v. Zapata Offshore Co., 784 F.2d 628, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 872, 107 S. Ct. 247 (1986); Lirette v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 467 So. 2d 29,
32 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985). The contrary is true with respect to a maritime contract
since a choice of law provision in the contract can oust the application of maritime
principles provided the state of choice has a substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction. Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Serv., 851 F.2d 1514, 1517 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 127.001-127.008 (Vernon 1989). An update
on the latest Texas Supreme Court decision setting forth the specificity required in a hold
harmless agreement is Payne & Keller v. P.P.G. Indus., 793 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1990).
47. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 127.005(c) (Vernon 1989). A review of
the Texas statute is set forth in Tade, Texas Anti-Indemnity Law Update, 53 Tex. B.J.
107 (1990).
48. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 127.001 (Vernon 1989).
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can be applied to all contracts interpreted in relation to an injury on
a fixed structure is that law selection clauses are unenforceable since
application of the substantive law of the adjoining state is mandated
by the OCSLA.4 9
C. Do Ryan or Reliable Transfer Principles Control in Matters Not
Covered by the Longshore Act?
It is reasonably clear that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits consider
the Ryan all-or-nothing doctrine to have been replaced by the Reliable
Transfer proportionate fault rule. Gator Marine Service Towing, Inc.
v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.50 reasoned in the context of property
damage litigation that the 1972 amendments to the Longshore Act call
for a rejection of indemnity predicated on the Ryan warranty since this
concept is now "a doctrine so withered."'" In conformity with Reliable
Transfer, the proportionate fault rule was accepted in a situation in
which improperly stowed cargo resulted in the capsizing of a vessel.
Two subsequent decisions, Bosnor S.A. de C.V. v. Tug L.A. Barrios2
and Agrico Chemical Co. v. M/V Ben W. Martin," have followed this
rationale. A contrary view was recently set forth by the Fifth Circuit
with the statement that "Ryan still has valid application in some cases
not involving workers covered by the LHWCA" ;54 however, this general
conclusion was given no further elaboration. The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit" refused to follow the Ryan theory when a vessel's
crew member was injured because a defective hatch board was placed
into position by the stevedore, reasoning that adherence to the propor-
49. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng'g, 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 136 (1990); however, maritime law may be ousted by a choice of law agreement
between the parties. Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Serv., Inc., 851 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1988).
50. 651 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 1100.
52. 796 F.2d 776, 784-86 (5th Cir. 1986).
53. 664 F.2d 85, 92-94 (5th Cir. 1981).
54. Verdin v. C & B Boat Co., 860 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1988). There is also an
indication in other decisions that an indemnitee is in a position to recover from the
maritime contractor for its contractual breach of the Ryan implied warranty of workmanlike
performance. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Suwannee River SPA L., 866 F.2d 752, 763
n.17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 77 (1989); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine
Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 401, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Sentry Ins. v. Todd
Shipyards Corp., 459 U.S. 1036, 103 S. Ct. 447 and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Todd Shipyards
Corp. 459 U.S. 1036, 103 S. Ct. 448 (1982); Stevens v. East-West Towing Co., 649 F.2d
1104, 1108-10 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., East-West Towing Co. v. Avondale
Shipyards, Inc., 454 U.S. 1145, 102 S. Ct. 1007 (1982).
55. Smith & Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia Tadj, 718 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1983). A




tionate fault concept would encourage the vessel owner to follow safety
procedures .36
The decisions described in the preceding paragraph are not consistent
with the views expressed by other courts. Campbell Industries, Inc. v.
Offshore Logistics International, Inc.5 7 involved a vessel owner seeking
indemnity from a marine contractor due to an injury to a seaman
assigned to the vessel. The trial court concluded that the accident resulted
from the conduct of the contractor, and the vessel owner was granted
a judgment for indemnity covering the maintenance and cure payments
attributed to the crew member's injury.58 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the Ryan doctrine remains viable in situations
which are not within the purview of the Longshore Act. In reaching
this conclusion the court rejected the S/S Concordia Tadj rationale.5 9
The result is that a vessel owner is entitled not only to recover for the
payments made to the injured party, but also for the legal fees and
expenses associated with the defense of the litigation. 6° Additionally, the
First, 61 Second, 62 Third, 63 and Fourth" Circuits have concluded that
maritime contractors owe the vessel owner, under Ryan, the implied
contractual duty of performing the work in a reasonably safe and
workmanlike manner with full indemnification.
The consequence of the divergent holdings by various courts increases
the tension between the Reliable Transfer and Ryan concepts. As noted
at the outset, Reliable Transfer approaches the problem on a propor-
tionate-fault theory, while Ryan is an all-or-nothing proposition allowing
56. A contrary conclusion regarding the continued vitality of Ryan was reached in
a cargo matter by this court in Insurance Co. of North America v. M/V Ocean Lynx,
901 F.2d 934, 941 (11th Cir. 1990).
57. 816 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927), reflected an early view that no
independent recovery could be obtained from a tortfeasor by the vessel owner for main-
tenance and cure payments to an injured seaman. This holding was rejected by the
following recent decisions: Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30 (2d
Cir. 1988); Savoie v. Lafourche Boat Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1980) (in-
demnity); and Adams v. Texaco, Inc., 640 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1981) (contribution). Texas
law is presently contrary to the trend. See Houston Belt & Term. R.R. v. Burmester,
309 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The latest opinion
from Louisiana accepts the contemporary trend. See Leveque v. Holloway's Propellers,
Inc., 540 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
59. See Insurance Co. of North America, 901 F.2d at 941; and Campbell Industries,
816 F.2d at 1404-05.
60. Id. at 1406.
61. Parks v. United States, 784 F.2d 20, 25-28 (1st Cir. 1986); Araujo v. Woods
Hole, Martha's Vineyard, 693 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982).
62. Saks Int'l, Inc. v. M/V Export Champion, 817 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1987).
63. Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1991).
64. Salter Marine, Inc. v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, 677 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1982).
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the vessel owner to recover attorney's fees and costs associated with the
defense of the litigation in the event the maritime contractor did not
perform in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner. 65 The difference
among the several Courts of Appeals can and should be resolved by
the Supreme Court. At no time since the 1972 amendments has the
Supreme Court indicated that Ryan is a "withered doctrine" when the
subject of litigation is not a maritime personal injury claim involving
a Longshore Act employer and a vessel owner.
D. The Recovery of a Personal Injury Litigant From a Non-Settling
Tortfeasor
Maritime law recognizes the concept of joint and several liability
among parties who are defending against a plaintiff's action. In other
words, the plaintiff is in a position to make a full recovery from one
tortfeasor eveti though this defendant's proportionate fault percentage
is of a lesser amount. 66 There is a problem associated with the proper
recovery for the plaintiff in the event of a settlement entered into with
one or more of the co-defendants. Must the remaining defendant pay
to the plaintiff an amount based on the percentage share of the non-
settling defendant's negligence, or must the payment equal the full
amount of the judgment minus the dollar amount of the settlement
figure? There is a lack of consistency on this issue.
Maritime law accepts the proposition that a defendant who enters
into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff has no further liability
for contribution to the remaining defendants in the litigation. 67 Whether
the monetary judgment against non-settling defendants should be reduced
by the percentage of the settling defendant's negligent conduct or by
the amount which the settling defendant actually paid to the plaintiff
is not clear.
Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.68 reviewed the question and
concluded that the plaintiff's recovery would be reduced by the settling
defendant's percentage of negligence as opposed to the amount of the
65. Supra note 59, at 1406.'
66. Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1428-32 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom., T. Smith & Sons, Inc. v. Simeon, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S. Ct. 3156
(1989).
67. Miller v. Christopher, 887 F.2d 902, 903-07 (9th Cir. 1989). This decision also
sets forth a comprehensive discussion for adherence to the Leger principle. See Leger v.
Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979). Texas law is consistent with
this point. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.016(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991); McNair
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 890 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1989). Texas also apparently
takes the position that the settling defendant cannot recover indemnity from the non-
settling defendant. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1987).
68. 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
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settlement figure. An opposite conclusion was reached in Self v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.69 which held that the amount paid by the
settling defendant would be subtracted from the plaintiff's judgment
instead of factoring the settling party's percentage of negligence into
the calculation. 70 The court concluded that Leger was not controlling
due to the intervening holding of Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique'7 1 which refused to reduce an injured longshoreman's
judgment against the vessel owner by the percentage of the stevedore's
negligence due to the statutory protection from indemnity or contribution
afforded the stevedore for an action instituted by its employee against
the vessel's interest. The most recent decision from the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit72 rejected the Leger formula7" in favor of the line
of reasoning set forth in Self. The court relied on Hernandez v. M/V
Rajaan7 4 in which there was no finding by the trial court of the settling
defendant's percentage of negligence. There has been no indication that
this court will resolve the apparent conflict with an en banc hearing.
It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit has not adequately explained
the reason it chose to employ the Self formula rather than the pro-
portionate percentage conclusion of Leger. The reason the non-settling
tortfeaser cannot recover from the one that entered into a settlement
agreement is due not to a statutory prohibition but to preference for
the independent action on the part of the plaintiff. The contrary con-
clusions reached by the courts in Leger and Self increased the personal
injury litigant's ultimate recovery in the context of an alternate option;
however, a result most favorable to the, plaintiff should not be the
judicial guide. The Fifth Circuit should consider the question en banc
69. 832 F.2d 1540 (lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Chevron Transp. Corp., 486 U.S. 1033, 108 S. Ct. 2017 (1988).
70. This result was reached even though another panel in the same year concluded:
"In this circuit, Leger applies to all theories of maritime liability apportionment including
indemnity and contribution." Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc., 809 F.2d 1529, 1532 (1lth
Cir. 1987).
71. 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
72. Myers v. Griffin-Alexander Drilling Co., 910 F.2d 1252, 1256 (5th Cir. 1990). It
is submitted that it was not necessary for the court to make a choice between Self and
Leger in order to decide the issue which was presented.
73. The following post Leger decisions are in accord with its formula. Vickers v.
Chiles Drilling Co., 822 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1987), held that the plaintiff's award
should be reduced by the percentages of his own and the settling co-defendant's negligence.
Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78 LTd., 749 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1985). See Simeon v. T. Smith
& Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1444-45 n.9 (5th Cir. 1988) (Garwood, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied sub nom., T. Smith & Sons, Inc. v. Simeon,
490 U.S. 1106, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989), for a discussion of the Leger/Sef distinction in
reducing the plaintiff's judgment by the prior settlement with a joint tortfeaser.
74. 841 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1988).
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or, in the alternative, the United States Supreme Court should decide
the issue.
E. Indemnity Pursuant to Terms of Charter Parties
The New York Produce Exchange charter party usually has a load,
stow and trim provision set forth in Clause 8 which provides for cargo
operations to be at the expense of the charterer. 7  Fortunately, the
Protection and Indemnity Clubs in Europe have entered an agreement
concerning responsibility for cargo damage or shortage as the loss relates
to claims for indemnity or contribution between the owner and the
charterer pursuant to Clause 8.76
The problem regarding claims for indemnity or contribution between
the owner and charterer usually concerns a longshore injury aboard the
vessel during the course of cargo operations. The Fifth Circuit concluded
in Woods v. Sammisa Co.7 that the charter party's load, stow and trim
provision did not create a right for indemnity on the part of the owner
against the charterer where improperly stowed cargo permitted a long-
shoreman to make a recovery from the vessel owner based upon neg-
ligence. The Second s and Ninth79 Circuits reached a contrary conclusion,
and this disagreement among several Court of Appeals prompted three
Justices of the Supreme Court to conclude that the vessel owner's petition
for a writ of certiorari in Woods should be granted. s0
Most charter parties contain an arbitration clause, and the district
court must grant arbitration in the event one of the parties makes a
proper motion.8 The enforcement of the arbitration clause is a suggested
75. The unamended language of Clause 8 provides "The Captain (although appointed
by the Owners), shall be under the orders and directions of the Charterers as regards
employment and agency, and Charterers are to load, stow, and trim, and discharge the
cargo at their expense under the supervision of the Captain, * * *," as quoted in Woods
v. Sammisa Co. Ltd., 873 F.2d 842, 845 (5th Cir. 1989). On many occasions the parties
will add language to the effect that cargo operations are to be under the supervision of
the master, or that it is the obligation of the charterer to discharge the cargo in addition
to the "to load, stow and trim responsibility."
76. M. Wilford, T. Coghlin, and J. Kimball, Time Charters, 251-53 (3d ed. 1989).
77. 873 F.2d 842, 856, cert. denied sub nom., Sammiline Co. v. Woods, 110 S. Ct.
853 (1990).
78. Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1976). See
Complaint of Delphinus Maritime, S.A., 523 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
79. Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
sub nom., Japan Lines, Ltd. v. Turner, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S. Ct. 294 (1982).
80. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Kennedy. Sammiline Co. v.
Woods, 110 S. Ct. 853 (1990).
81. E.A.S.T., Inc. v. M/V Alaia, 876 F.2d 1168, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1989); Ivey v.
Baronia Shipping Co., 741 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (dispute between the owner
and the charterer for indemnity should be stayed pending arbitration pursuant to a clause
in the agreement between them).
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procedure for an owner or charterer in a district court which accepts
a position on the load, stow and trim provision contrary to the party's
interest.
As previously noted, the Protection and Indemnity Clubs in Europe
have demonstrated a reasonable approach to cargo litigation by the
Inter-Club Agreement. Perhaps a similar understanding could be reached
on the subject of personal injury litigation since the Supreme Court
apparently will not formulate a uniform rule to be followed in this
country.
Another area of possible dispute between the owner and the charterer
is the charter party provision which allows the charterer to designate a
safe berth.8 2 The Fifth Circuit, in Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp.,3
recently rejected the theory that this provision constituted a warranty
from the charterer to the owner and, in so doing, defined the charterer's
duty to the vessel owner as one of exercising due diligence in selecting
the port or berth. This conclusion was recognized as being contrary to
holdings by the Second Circuit which classified the safe berth provision
as a warranty.84 The Fifth Circuit once again rejected a Ryan type
warranty for a duty defined within the reasonable care concept which
in turn would conform with the Reliable Transfer concept of weighing
the conduct of the owner and charterer on a proportionate fault basis.
F. The Stevedore's Right of Recovery From the Vessel Owner
The stevedore has a lien against any recovery made by its employee
in a section 905(b) action against the vessel's interest, with the lien
comprising compensation payments and medical expenses made by the
stevedore for injuries experienced by the longshoreman. s5 The stevedore
faces future exposure for compensation benefits in the event the net
82. M. Wilford, T. Coghlin, and J. Kimball, supra note 76, at 136-164.
83. 913 F.2d 1149, 1155-57 (5th Cir. 1990). An earlier opinion from this court in
support of this view is Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 801-02 (5th
Cir. 1977). Other decisions which expressed disapproval of the warranty standard are:
Matter of Complaint of Jubilant Voyager Corp. S.A. of Panama (The Cockrow), 1984
A.M.C. 1725, 1726 (E.D. Va. 1983); People of State of Cal. By and Through Dept. of
Transp. v. S/T Norfolk, 435 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-49 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
84. Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego Shipping Co., 498 F.2d 469, 472-73 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., Banco Do Brasil v. Venore Transp. Co., 419 U.S. 998, 95 S. Ct.
313 (1974); Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188 F.2d 804, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1951);
Cities Serv. Transp. Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 79 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1935). See also M.
Wilford, T. Coghlin, and J. Kimball, Time Charterers, 136-164 (3d ed. 1989); T. Schoen-
baum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 389-90 (1987); G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law
of Admiralty, 204-5 (2d ed. 1975).
85. 33 U.S.C. 933(b) (1982) (superceding Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 445
U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980) as stated in Session v. I.T.O. Corp. of Ameriport, 618
F. Supp. 325 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1086, 107 S. Ct. 1290 (1987)).
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amount received by the plaintiff is inadequate to meet the full com-
pensation benefits afforded by the Longshore Act." When the injured
longshoreman does not commence an action against the vessel's interest,
the stevedore has the right under certain circumstances to proceed against
the vessel owner by stepping into the shoes of the injured longshoreman.
Cumbersome restrictions placed on this type of action, for the most
part, prevent the employer from recovering its lien for compensation
benefits paid the injured worker.87 Nevertheless, there is an under-utilized
avenue available to the stevedore and its compensation carrier from the
pre-1972 era of longshore litigation known as the Burnside theory.
The Supreme Court in Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside
Shipping Co.,8s held that the stevedore has a remedy in tort against the
vessel owner for reimbursement of compensation benefits, and it is
suggested that the vessel owner owes a duty of due care under the
circumstances.8 9 The Fifth Circuit, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Costa Lines Cargo Services, Inc., 90 recently confirmed this ob-
ligation on the part of the vessel's interest to the stevedore/employer
and concluded that the duty was independent of any claim on the part
of the injured worker. This remedy afforded the stevedore is essentially
the reverse of Ryan, and it is a formidable right of action in view of
the typically significant compensation and medical expense payments
which are components of the lien.
A criticism of the continued vitality of the Burnside theory is that
the Longshore Act specifically terminated the Ryan theory of recovery
on the part of the vessel owner, which makes it difficult to accept the
proposition that the reverse is not true. Why should the stevedore be
permitted to recover its compensation payments from the vessel owner
when this same party is precluded from seeking indemnity or contribution
from the employer in an Edmonds91 situation? In fact, the vessel owner
under Edmonds paid the plaintiff not only for its percentage of neg-
ligence, but also for the percentage of negligence attributed to the
stevedore/employer.
86. 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) and (g) (1982).
87. 33 U.S.C. 933(b) (1982) transfers the maritime worker's action against the vessel
to the stevedore provided a formal order is issued by the deputy commissioner, an
administrative law judge or board. The transfer occurs six months from the date of the
award assuming that the injured employee has not previously instituted litigation; addi-
tionally, the assignment is valid for a ninety day period, with the cause of action
automatically reverting to the injured worker upon the lapse of the period.
88. 394 U.S. 404, 89 S. Ct. 1144 (1969).
89. Id. at 416-17. Hinson v. SS Paros, 461 F. Supp. 219, 223 (S.D. Tex. 1978) held
that "employers or their compensation insurance carriers are limited to the recovery of
compensation benefits paid ... and that in no instance can they recover more than the
injured worker or his beneficiaries."
90. 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1990).
91. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753
(1979).
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G. Should a Negligent Stevedore Be in a Position to Recover Its
Lien in the Event a Recovery Is Awarded A Longshoreman in- the
Action Against the Vessel?
The ability of a negligent stevedore to effect a full recovery of its
lien from the longshoreman's judgment 92 is an area which has not been
fully explored by attorneys for either the injured longshoreman or the
vessel owner. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique"3 in-
volved an injury to a longshoreman who was crushed between a container
and the ship's bulkhead. The allocation of negligence was set at vessel
owner-201o, stevedore-70%, and the injured longshoreman-10%. Un-
der the Reliable Transfer formula, the plaintiff's recovery against the
vessel owner should be-limited to 20%; however, the Longshore Act
precludes either the injured worker or the vessel owner recovering from
the stevedore/employer. The Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to
recover 90016 of his monetary loss from the vessel owner on the theory
that this party, as opposed to the longshoreman, should bear the risk
of a loss allocation. There is no language in this opinion which would
prevent the stevedore from recovering the full amount of its lien for
compensation benefits from the funds awarded the plaintiff. In other
words, the vessel owner is making an indirect payment to the stevedore
in a situation in which the negligence of the employer played a significant
role in the casualty.
The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments stresses the need
for encouraging safety procedures on the part of both the vessel owner
and the stevedore. The objective of safety was given as a reason for
establishing a negligence standard on the part of the vessel's interest
and for increasing the compensation benefits to the injured worker.94
Additionally, the legislative history of the statute categorically states that
the vessel shall not be responsible for the conduct, acts, omissions, or
equipment of the stevedore or the method in which the stevedoring
operations are conducted. 95 An equitable result is not reached in a factual
situation similar to that encountered in Edmonds, and consideration
should be given to a system which does not reward the negligent employer
by permitting a full recovery of its lien. The failure to enforce a
compensation lien against the longshoreman's judgment against the vessel
owner would permit a double recovery. One remedial avenue would be
for the vessel owner to be given a credit for that portion of the lien
92. Bloom& v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 445 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980); 33 U.S.C.
§ 933(b) (1982).
93. 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
94. Supra note 8.
95. Supra note 8, at 4703-04.
[Vol. 51
MARITIME LAW
which is equal to the percentage of the stevedore's negligence, with the
result that the stevedore will not profit from its negligent conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
The confusion and lack of clear guidelines associated with maritime
contribution and indemnity bring to mind the problems of basic maritime
personal injury litigation claims which arise from the variety of rules
governing recovery. There can be no precision in projecting a maritime
client's future financial exposure and no certain strategy for pursuing
a recovery for maritime indemnity or contribution until there has been
radical reform of the remedial legislation for maritime workers. A worker
on a fixed structure faces essentially the same hazards as one who is
injured on a platform which can be floated to various locations, yet
the available financial recoveries are vastly different. The same is true
for remedies which are available to the parties at fault who seek a
division, by way of indemnity or contribution, for their financial losses.
It is difficult to accept an appellate court's judicial determination
of the Supreme Court's Ryan doctrine as "withered," since the Supreme
Court has given no indication that Ryan has lost vitality in situations
which do not involve an injury within the scope of the Longshore Act.
The problem is compounded by a general indication from this same
appellate court that Ryan remains viable in certain instances. One so-
lution would be to use Reliable Transfer as the guide when both parties
are negligent, but to follow Ryan when the indemnitee's liability to the
plaintiff results solely from the indemnitor's breach of a contractual
duty. The prevailing party could then recover attorney's fees and costs
associated with the defense of the litigation, in addition to the funds
paid the plaintiff. The tensions resulting from the existence of the various
statutes and decisions relating to offshore matters, however, can only
be solved by congressional action.
An additional measure of uniform maritime principles could be
achieved if the United States Supreme Court would decide those issues
which are currently the subject of disparate opinions among the appellate
courts. It is apparent from this article that conflicts exist among various
courts with respect to the applicability of the Ryan measure of damages,
the continued acceptability of the Leger formula, the definition to be
given a charter party's load, stow and trim provision, and whether the
safe berth obligation on the part of the charterer constitutes a warranty
to the vessel owner. Added to this list of judicial inconsistencies in the
maritime field is the recent failure of courts to agree upon (1) the
definition to be given the Scindia negligence standard in the context of
a longshoreman's action against the vessel; 96 (2) the party which has
96. Compare Woods v. Sammissa Co., 873 F.2d 842, 848, cert. denied sub nom.,
19911
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
the burden of proof in the event of cargo loss due to fire;9 and (3)
the definition of the unit which constitutes a "package" pursuant to
the $500 monetary limit of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.98
The law student is led to believe on the first day of class that
maritime law requires uniformity.Y The opposite result has been reached
due principally to the failure of the United States Supreme Court to
resolve conflicting results reached by various courts of appeals and the
apparent inability of the United States Congress to enact consistent
legislation. The result is forum shopping, uncertainty, and a lack of
clear guidelines for parties who wish to avoid future litigation by pre-
paring an enforceable contract prior to entering a maritime enterprise.
Sammiline Co. v. Woods, 110 S. Ct. 853 (1990) with Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K., 835
F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007, 108 S. Ct. 1733 (1988).
97. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. M/V Leslie Lykes, 734 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577 (1985) with Sunkist Growers, Inc. v.
Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.,
Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 444 U.S. 1012, 100 S. Ct. 659
(1980).
98. Compare Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
419 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 134 (1974) with Aluminos Pozuelos, Ltd. v. SS Navigator, 407
F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. "[M]aritime law traditionally resists doctrinal change that might balkanize its
uniformity and generality." Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir. 1983).
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